On 9 December 2014, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 2014 amended the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 by removing the requirement for an intelligence or visual surveillance warrant in some situations of emergency or urgency. The warrant process is the primary mechanism for the purpose of ensuring surveillance powers are not exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Any departure from this process must be justified, limited and proportionate. After a brief look at the history of the Bill, this paper will then consider the circumstances in which a warrantless authorisation shall be granted and information retained, with reference to the trigger concepts of "terrorist act", "foreign terrorist fighter" and "security". Amendments proposed include limiting the grounds for warrantless surveillance and information retention to countering "foreign terrorist fighters". It will then discuss the consistency of the Bill with the New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act, focussing on the authorisation structure and length. It will put forward an amendment that restructures the power such that authorisation for surveillance in urgency will be provided by the Minister and Commissioner within 12 hours.
I Introduction
The traditional divide between domestic and foreign threats has been eroded with global trends in international migration and expanded use of the Internet, rapidly The warrant process is the primary mechanism for the purpose of ensuring surveillance powers are not exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Any departure from this process must be justified, limited and proportionate. 8 This paper does not consider whether warrantless surveillance in situations of emergency or urgency is a justifiable extension of powers to the security intelligence service. Rather, it will examine the breadth and duration of the power as enacted in the light of the principle of legality and human rights. In making this analysis, this paper seeks to determine whether the scope of the current power is proportionate to the foreign terrorist fighter threat, and put forward possible amendments that will circumscribe the overzealous enactment.
After a brief look at the history of the Bill, this paper will then consider the circumstances in which a warrantless authorisation shall be granted and information retained, with reference to the trigger concepts of "terrorist act", "foreign terrorist fighter" and "security". It will then discuss the consistency of the Bill with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, focusing on the authorisation approval structure and period of validity. A few concluding remarks will close the paper.
II Impetus for the Amendment
in advance of the comprehensive review of legislative required to commence before 30 June 2015. 10 The Bill was the result of the targeted review's recommendations.
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The review and provisions are in part a reflection of New Zealand's international obligation to comply with United Nations Security Resolution 2178 as enacted under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 12 This Resolution expressed grave concern over the "acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters". 13 The
Resolution reaffirmed that all States shall prevent the movement of terrorists by effective border controls; intensify international information sharing and cooperation;
and to make efforts to prevent radicalization, recruitment, financial support and operation of foreign fighters. 14 It leaves to states the responsibility of deciding what legislation is necessary to achieve these goals, consistent with international human rights, humanitarian principles, and refugee law. 15 Perhaps surveillance is the necessary foundation for practical implementation of these measures, but it is notable that the Resolution does not expressly encourage the expansion of state surveillance powers. Furthermore, it was stated by a member of the Select Committee on the Bill that New Zealand's law before amendment complied with Resolution 2178. 16 As a result, the Resolution does not provide a solid foundation upon which to enact overzealous legislation.
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In October 2014, New Zealand's domestic threat level was raised from very low to low, indicating that a terrorist attack is possible, but not expected. Inspector-General for investigation. 57 It is the responsibility of the Director to ensure that any directions are carried out without delay.
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After expiry of an authorisation, if no application has been made for a warrant, the Director must provide a report to the Minister or, where appropriate, the Commissioner, including reasons the authorisation was given, no application for a warrant was made and the nature of the information collected under the authorisation. 59 The Minister or Commissioner must determine whether it was appropriate for that authorisation to have been given, and refer the matter to the Inspector-General for investigation. 60 If an authorisation is followed by a warrant application that is refused, the Director must refer the matter to the Inspector-General for investigation.
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If no warrant is issued in relation to the authorisation, the Minister must ensure that any records are destroyed except information that may be prejudicial to security.
62
The decision to retain records must be referred to the Inspector-General for investigation. 63 The breadth of this retention clause raises questions because it allows information to be retained on grounds wider than that for which it was authorised to be collected, and will be considered in more depth in Part III.
Evidently, the Inspector-General operates the integral oversight mechanism for the exercise of authorisation powers. However, debate in the House raised concerns regarding the statutory political neutrality, independence and powers of the InspectorGeneral to ensure intelligence and security agencies comply with the law, given the advisory role of the office. 64 The powers and role of the Inspector-General are to be reviewed in the wider intelligence and security community review this year. • Death or serious bodily injury; or
• "serious risk to health or safety of a population"; or
• serious interference or disruption to an infrastructure facility, "if likely to endanger human life"; or
• "destruction of, or serious damage to property of great value or importance, major economic loss, or major environmental damage" if likely to result in the aforementioned outcomes; or
• "introduction or release of a disease-bearing organism, if likely to devastate the national economy of a country". proportionate with the threat for which they were enacted. In the House, the proposed amendment was supported by the Labour Party as a "reasonable" effort to invoke "greater clarity and greater certainty" into definitions in the Bill. 117 Precision of legislative drafting is integral to adhering to the principle of legality, and this SOP provides a good vehicle through which New Zealand can improve its provision.
Information retention after "expiry of an authorisation… if no warrant has been issued"
A provision that attracted surprisingly little debate in the House was the data retention clause under s 4IE (9), given that the implications of its drafting potentially undermine several safeguards surrounding the exercise of warrantless surveillance authorisations.
This section states that if no warrant is issued in relation to the authorisation, the
Minister must ensure that any records resulting from activities undertaken pursuant to that authorisation are destroyed. However, records may be retained where they are relevant to the detection of activities prejudicial to security, or to the gathering of foreign intelligence essential to security. 118 The decision to retain records must be referred to the Inspector-General for investigation. 119 This retention clause provides a route through which the requirements for an authorisation may be systematically undermined.
The provision must be broken down to understand the full extent of what it allows.
The phrase "after the expiry of an authorisation" is vague as to the circumstances which amount to an expiry. An authorisation is valid for a period not exceeding 24 hours and it logically follows that an authorisation will expire at the end of this time.
However, it is not clear whether the provision applies to authorisations that are Finally, the provision does not limit the ability to retain information gathered during authorisations deemed appropriate by oversight authorities. The Minister and
Commissioner must determine whether an authorisation not followed by a warrant application was appropriate to be given and refer the matter to the InspectorGeneral. 120 Furthermore, the Inspector-General has a role of investigation where a warrant application is refused. 121 This lack of specificity leaves open the possibility that information may be retained where oversight authorities have determined that the authorisation should not have been given.
Retention on grounds of "security"
A second issue with the retention clause is the breadth of the grounds upon which information may be retained.
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression expressed concern over vague and unspecified notions of national security that have become an acceptable justification for surveillance: the use of an amorphous concept of national security to justify invasive limitations on the enjoyment of human rights is of serious concern. The concept is broadly defined and is thus vulnerable to manipulation by the State as a means of justifying actions that target vulnerable grounds such as human rights defenders, journalists or activists.
As an illustration, the United Nations Human Rights Committee seventh periodic report of the United Kingdom stated that access to communications data should be "limited to the extent strictly necessary for the prosecution of the most serious crimes".
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Therefore, the second issue with the information retention provision is the breadth of the clause, as it applies to information about activities that may be prejudicial to "security". Security is defined in section 2 of the NZSIS Act as: It is clear that terrorism itself is only a subset of the breadth of the concept of security.
In its submission on the Bill, the Law Society pointed to the fact that neither the commission of an offence, nor a risk to life or safety feature in a provision regarding national security.
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The generous scope of the retention clause is especially peculiar given that, following select committee recommendation, subs 4ID(1) was amended to provide that authorisations for warrantless surveillance must only be granted for counterterrorism activities. The purpose of this amendment was to reduce the scope power, which originally stood on grounds of security, and bring the provision within the counterterrorism intent of the Bill. 126 Further, the statutory mechanism to ensure deletion of information provides for a fine of up to $10,000 for knowing failure to delete records resulting from activities taken pursuant to an authorisation. This amount was increased from $1,000 following select committee recommendation in order to reflect the seriousness of the offence. 127 Similarly, the Law Society supported this increase stating that a firmer safeguard would strengthen the obligation to put in place "appropriate policies and procedures to ensure the Bill is complied with".
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Both of these increased safeguards are systematically undermined by the information retention clause. The clause circumvents the counterterrorism intent of the power by allowing any information collected to be retained on grounds of national security. It then undermines the safeguard against failure to delete records by legalising the retention of information that was never authorised to be collected.
Australian legislation has no provision tailored specifically to Director-authorised warrants, but its general information retention clause provides that information not relevant to security must be destroyed. 129 United Kingdom legislation requires that information is destroyed as soon as there are no longer any grounds for retaining it as necessary for any of the "authorised purposes" under a warrant, information necessary 131 Evidently, these three jurisdictions allow for the retention of information on grounds that reflect those for which a warrant is granted and, in the case of the United Kingdom, for the practical operation of oversight and judicial mechanisms.
To address the loophole in s 4IE (9), it is imperative that the information retention clause is restricted to information regarding the activities of foreign terrorist fighters only where an authorisation has been followed by a warrant or approved as reasonable by the Inspector-General. Thereby, the clause will facilitate the retention of records that were collected on a solid legal foundation.
B Citizens as Subjects of Rights and Justified Limits
Resolution 2178 impleaded States to adhere to their international human rights obligations, stating that failure to comply with these obligations is one of the factors that contributes to increased radicalization and fosters a sense of impunity. 132 Failure to restrict counterterrorism laws pose the risk that they will offend the principle of proportionality that governs the permissibility of restriction on human rights and fundamental freedoms. 133 As a result, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that "measures should be taken to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity." Commission established that warrantless surveillance powers in exceptional circumstances were available at law for law enforcement authorities. However, "the exceptional nature of such powers makes it essential to codify their existence and scope". 143 The report, therefore, considered three issues of statutory drafting: the offence for which surveillance without warrant ought to be available; the approval process that should precede or follow its use; and the maximum period over which surveillance without warrant should be conducted. 144 These issues will be considered here in relation to warrantless surveillance powers for the NZSIS.
The first issue is of the circumstances in which an authorisation can be given.
Reminiscent of the principle of legality argument in the preceding section, there exists a mismatch between the threat that the Bill sought to address, and the breadth of the powers that have been enacted. Warrantless surveillance powers applicable to both domestic intentioned and foreign intentioned actors are disproportionate to the objective of countering foreign terrorist fighters. Where the power is exercised to authorise surveillance in circumstances other than that of a suspected foreign terrorist fighter, an individual's right to privacy and protection from unreasonable search and seizure will be unjustifiably implicated. 
V Conclusion
The latest and most recent manifestation of the terrorist threat is that of the foreign terrorist fighter. As a result of combined international pressure and increase of the domestic threat level at home, and in order to increase domestic capacity to respond to these threats, New Zealand has enacted emergency powers for the NZSIS. The Bill introduced the ability to conduct warrantless surveillance for 24 hours where there is an actual, potential or suspected terrorist act or facilitation of a terrorist act. The Bill was rushed through Parliament under urgency, resulting in significant short-cuts in 153 Privacy Commissioner, above n 8, at 3. 154 Law Commission, above n 136, at [11.112] .
terms of public and external consultation. As a result, the Bill presents several shortcomings.
The Office of Prime Minister and Cabinet provided incomplete information to the Select Committee that did not emphasise the stark differences between the provisions of Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand in the context of emergency surveillance. Whereas privacy rights are upheld by the warrant procedure, New
Zealand has taken a significant step further than our Commonwealth partners in eroding this right.
The use of the term "terrorist act" offends the principle of legality. The definition itself is vague, with the potential to be applied very broadly. Its breadth does not distinguish between domestic threats and foreign terrorist fighters, thereby extending the power of warrantless surveillance over actors that did not and do not present a threat large enough to justify intrusive state powers. The enactment also contains an information retention clause that creates a significant loophole in the legislation.
The Ministry of Justice's advice on consistency of the Bill with NZBORA provided did not acknowledge the true complexities of the power. While in the context of police powers warranted searches have been found to be reasonable by the Courts, discussion of the shape and scope of the newly enacted powers and their impact on unreasonable search and seizure remained unaddressed and unjustified.
However, in accordance with s 21 of the Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996, a review of the intelligence and security agencies, the legislation governing them, and their oversight legislation must have been commenced before 30 June 2015. 155 In the security intelligence context, in which outside debate is precluded by redactions and withheld information, the review will provide a vital forum for deeper analysis of the issues that have been raised in this paper and others, including recourse for individuals subject to surveillance, guidance to the courts, the efficacy of the Inspector-General as an oversight mechanism and, most importantly, the necessity of warrantless surveillance powers at all in the security intelligence context. 155 Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996, s 21(1).
VI Appendix

Intelligence Warrant
Pre-existing warrant procedure.
Visual Surveillance Warrant:
Enacted by NZSISA Act 2014.
Warrantless authorisations
Enacted by NZSISA Act 2014. 
Power Authorised
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